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Abstract
This paper considers the eect of corruption and military spending on economic
growth, analyzing both the direct impact of public spending and the eect of allocating
resources between categories of public spending within the framework of an endogenous
growth model. The model exhibits non-linearities as a result of the links between the
components of public spending, corruption and economic growth. The main ndings
of the empirical analysis conrm the expectation that corruption and military burden
lower the growth rate of GDP per capita. They also suggest that when the the eect of
the complementarity between military spending and corruption is omitted, as in most
studies, the impact of military burden on economic performance is underestimated.
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11 Introduction
Allegations of corruption in the military sector are neither infrequent nor unexpected. It
is often argued that the limited competition in the defence sector leads to a relatively high
level of informal contracts and to rent-seeking activities, providing fertile ground for the
growth of corrupt practices (Transparency International, 2002). This can lead to an increase
in the cost of military activities and their burden on the economies, directly through rent
seeking in the military sector and indirectly by crowding out productive investment in the
private sector.
This paper uses the theoretical framework of the endogenous growth model originally
developed by Barro (1990) and introduces as key explanatory variables the complementary
eects that arise between private and public sectors and the detrimental eects of corrup-
tion. In this model government expenditure on the military sector and public investment are
dened as potentially productive inputs, with diering productivity and corruption impacts
on the long run economic growth. The model also incorporates any ineciencies in corrup-
tion linked services provided by the public sector (red tape and administrative corruption),
although they do not aect long run growth.
This research adds to a number of empirical papers that test if the increase in corruption
enhance the level of military spending (and vice-versa), implying that they are complements
in constraining economic growth (Mauro, 1995, 1998; Aizenman and Glick, 2003). It is
particularly close in spirit to Tanzi (1998) Gupta et al. (2001) who argued that productive
public investments are scaled down in countries with widespread corruption, in favour of less
veriable/transparent government expenditure, such as military spending. It contributes in
this literature in two ways using a large panel of African countries. First, testing if the mag-
nitude of corruption is associated with the size of expenditure on the military sector (as well
as government spending on investment) and how this externality leads to reduced economic
growth. Second. estimating elasticities from empirical model and undertaking sensitivity
analyses. In particular, the robustness of the results are investigated by considering how
2high and low shares of military expenditure might inuence the correlation of corruption
and the growth rate.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
model and describe the empirical hypothesis derived by a comparative static analysis. Section
3 presents the data and methods used, with Section 4 presenting the empirical results. Finally
Section 5 provides some conclusions.
2 Theoretical model
In our model a representative household produces a composite commodity, which can be
consumed, accumulated as capital or paid as income tax and a government provides three
dierent public goods by spending in the defence sector, public investments and current
government consumption. As in Shieh et al. (2002), it is assumed that the components
of public spending may have complementary eects to the private productive sector and
that current government consumption can also directly aect the utility function of the
representative household. To complete the theoretical framework corruption1 is included,
which can complement government spending in aecting the growth rate.
2.1 Model set-up
Consider a representative household maximizing a utility function, choosing the optimal
amount of private consumption, conditional on the services provided by the government.






where c and cp are the arguments related to private and current government consumption,
1Corruption is generally dened as the abuse of public oce for private gain. Nye (1967) denes corruption
as behaviour which deviates from the normal duties of a public role because of private pecuniary or status
gain, or violates rules against the exercise of private-regarding inuence.
3respectively, and  is the subjective discount rate. To keep the specication as simple as
possible, we model an instantaneous utility function in logarithmic form:
(2) U(c;cp) = lnc +  lncp
where  measures the amount of services that are eectively provided by the government,
which may be interpreted as the pervasiveness of red tape in the economic system 2, and in
countries with weak institutions this is strongly related to administrative corruption3. When
 = 1; the entire amount of current government consumption is used to provide services to
household, while for  < 1 there are ineciencies.
The production function is modelled as an interaction between private capital k and total
public spending G, which is distributed across two productive public expenditure categories,
that we identify as military spending M and public investment I, and current government
consumption expenditure cp. The production function in aggregate embodies constant re-
turns to scale technology, with diminishing returns to each factor:






The household budget constraint is given by:






where  is the at-rate of income tax.
We assume that the government uses the total amount of tax collected (y) to nance
total public spending (G), allocating it among the productive public sectors (M; I) and
current government consumption (cp). The government then follows specic rules described
2We dene red tape as "unnecessary" or "excessive" ocial routines, rules,or procedures resulting in
delays: see Guriev (2004).
3In particular, administrative corruption worsens the eectiveness of the services delivered by the public
sector and reduces the contribute of current government consumption to household utility.
4by:
M = h1gmilG (5)
I = h2ginvG (6)
cp = h3gconsG (7)
where gmil; ginv and gcons denote the fraction of public resources allocated to the dierent
components. It is also assumed that corruption aects these expenditures, with h1, h2 and
h3 identifying the impact on military spending, public investment and current government
consumption respectively.
The representative household choses the optimal amount of private consumption so as to
maximize (2) subject to (4), (5), (6), (7) and given an initial level of private capital k. The













where  is the growth rate of consumption. Following Devarajan et al. (1996) this depends
on the allocation of spending across categories of government expenditure and on the amount
of general corruption aecting the performance indicators4 It is worth noting that assuming
the degree of corruption can be modelled as a tax allows the degree of exposure to corruption
to vary across categories of productive public expenditures, see Mariani (2007); Acemoglu
and Verdier (1998) and Delavallade (2007).
In the steady-state, the tax rate  (and hence G=k) is constant and we can rearrange the
previous formulation as:













This formulation has the advantage that the growth rate is specied only as a function of
the government spending categories and the relative levels of corruption. It is important to
stress that only general corruption enters directly into the growth equation and corruption
only aects the household utility function indirectly. This result is linked to the choice of an
isoelastic functional form for the utility function.
2.2 Comparative statics
Consider gi one component of the government expenditure, gi. Without loss of generality,
the partial derivative of  with respect to gi is described as:
@
@gi







i is the optimal share of resources of the sector i, which depends on the relation
between its productivity and that of other public spending categories. As argued in Gupta
et al. (2001), the decisions that determine the allocation of resources to each sector are not
exclusively motivated by need, but also by the possibility, for bureaucrats and/or policy-
makers to make private gains. For this reason, it seems reasonable to assume that the
degree of exposure to corruption is not identical across categories of government spending.
Furthermore, because we analyze the eects on economic growth, leaving the analysis of the
impact of corruption on welfare for future work, we can assume that the impact of corruption
on current government consumption is negligible, i.e., h3  = 1.
Making the general assumption that corruption has a negative eect,
@
@hi < 0 (where
6i = 1;2) and 0 < hi 5 1, gives5:
























We note that when the share of government spending is higher (lower) than the optimal
level, so that it has positive (negative) eects on growth rate, complementarities between
the components of government spending and corruption arise. This is the main feature of
the model that we consider in the empirical section.
To illustrate some properties of the model, gure 1 shows the simulated growth rates for
changes in gmil and ginv, the shares of military spending and public investment, respectively,
and the impact of changes in the levels of corruption h1 and h2.
Figure 1: Government spending components, corruption and growth
Notes: gmil and ginv are the shares of military and investment spending respectively and h1 and h2 describe the levels of corruption in the
two categories of spending. The parameters used for the simulations are:  = 0:1;  = 0:2,  = 0:6; A = 0:7;  = 0:02
The solid line shows the baseline case in which corruption does not aect the growth rate
(i.e., h1 = h2 = 1). The simulation functions (and the parameters used in the simulation)
5In this framework we do not allow for the possibility that corruption might promote economic growth
by relaxing inecient and rigid regulations imposed by governments (see for example, Dreher and Herzfeld
(2005).
7are taken from Devarajan et al. (1996). The result above illustrates that the growth rate
rises if the share of the government expenditure component is less that its optimal share g
i,
with the form of the hump-shaped depending on the dierences in productivity between the
components.
Figure 2: Comparative static results
Notes:We describe with gmil and ginv the shares of resources to military and investment spending respectively, whereas h1 and h2 describe
the levels of corruption in the two public sectors. The parameters used for the simulations are:  = 0:1;  = 0:2,  = 0:6; A = 0:7;  = 0:02
The second panel shows that public investment remains productive up to a relatively high
share, unlike the share of current expenditure in the rst panel. The broken lines show the
model predictions for how corruption aects this relationship and, as expected, corruption
in the more productive public investments has a greater negative impact on the growth
rate. The simulations in Figure 2 conrm the expected signs derived from the comparative
static analysis. The outcomes described in the rst panel of Figure 2 show that the higher
productivity of the second sector (by the imposition of  > ) shifts the optimal level of
ginv to the right. The derivative of , with respect to ginv suggests increased shares of public
resources have a positive impact up to a share of 20 percent. The second panel in Figure 2
plots the interaction eects of corruption and government spending on the growth rate and
shows a positive (but decreasing) corruption complementarity that is more pronounced for
ginv
83 Data and Methods
3.1 Data
Our empirical analysis uses a panel data set of 53 African countries for ve years (from
2003 to 2007). The main source of our data is the African development indicator (ADI),
available from the World Bank (WBI) and a complete list of countries is reported in Appendix
1.
As reported above, the expenditures of the government sector is divided into two poten-
tially productive components, military (gmil), public investment (ginv), with current govern-
ment consumption (gcons) the residual category. 6. Private investment (pinv) is measured by
the private xed capital formation. All the variable are expressed as percentage of GDP and
the dependent variable is the annual growth rate of per-capita GDP (). We proxy corrup-
tion (corr) by the "control of corruption index", an index derived by the survey that varies
from 0 to 100. Although this index includes each component of corruption, it is mainly
perceived as reecting general corruption, not only because in African countries it is the
magnitude of this general corruption that is most relevant, but also because administrative
corruption shows much less variation over time. Two control variables that have received
large attention in the economics literature, mainly in studies of private investment in African
countries are then considered. The rst variable measure the degree of economic openness
(open) and is obtained by the sum of imports and exports as a percentage of GDP, Ndiku-
mana and Baliamoune-Lutz (2008). The second variable (stability) measures the impact of
violent acts on the life of citizens of a country, specically with regard to the entrepreneurial
sector.
In Figure 3, we plot bivariate relationships between the growth rate and the relevant
6That is, it is not directly collected in the survey but calculated as the dierence between total government
spending and public investment. Current government consumption derived in this way above does contain
double counting of the components of consumption of the military sectors. We can reasonably assume that
this bias does not have much inuence the estimation results as it seems reasonable to suppose that current
military spending aects the growth rate in a similar way to consumption in aggregate.
9Figure 3: Government spending, corruption and economic growth
(a) Military spending (b) Public investments
(c) Current government consumption (d) Corruption
(e) Private investment
10variables in equation (11). Although the results are in line with the theoretical predictions
of the model, the plots also suggest existence of clusters of countries. These are apparent
in panels (a) and (d), where the explanatory variables are the share of military spending in
GDP and the dimension of general corruption. As Cuaresma and Reitschuler (2004) notes,
marked non-linearities are likely to emerge when we specify a multivariate model and to
allow for this we introduce interaction terms.
3.2 Methods
In this section we briey review the econometric method used to estimate the growth
equation (11), by a dynamic panel data approach, see Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano
and Bover (1995), Blundell and Bond (1998). We include in equation (11) period dummies
(t) are used to control for time shocks, which might aect aggregate growth in any period
but are not otherwise captured by the explanatory variables. Formally, the dynamic model
is written as,
(12) it = 1it 1 + 2ginvit + 3pinvit +   ! 4Xit + vi + t + it
where i represents the country and t represents the year (i = 1;2;::N;t = 1;2;::T). Thus,
it is the average annual growth for country i during period t and it 1 is the value of the
variable at time t   1.
Xit = [gmil; gcons; corr; gmilcorr, ginvcorr] is a vector of exogenous covariates, ginv is
assumed to be a predetermined variable7 and pinv is specied as an endogenous variables. It
is worth noting that the endogeneity of pinv does emerges from the model, notably from the
capital accumulation process in equation 4. In addition, the xed eects vi and the idiosyn-
7Statistically, we dene xit as a predetermined variable when the error term at time t has some feedback
on the subsequent realizations of xit. Hence, for predetermined variables we have that E[xit;it] 6= 0 for
s 6 t and E[xit;it] = 0 for s > t.
11cratic shocks it have to be orthogonal components, with the following moment conditions:
E [it] = E [vi] = E [itvi] = 0
Although, the GMM estimators used below may account for endogeneity, it could still be
a potential problem in inference. We make the channel by which private investment (pinv)
can be aected by economic growth explicit, by estimating an auxiliary dynamic model using
the System GMM estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998). The model is written as,
(13) pinvit = 11pinvit 1 + !11Git + ui + "it
where Git = [open; stability; ginv; corr] is a vector of exogenous variables that the liter-
ature in this eld has found to aect the decisions of private investments (see, for example
Ndikumana and Baliamoune-Lutz, 2008). ui is the xed eect and "it are the idiosyncratic
shocks8. As a second stage, we include in equation (12) the predicted values of investment
as an exogenous predictor for growth, d pinvit:
In order to estimate (12), we use the Arellano and Bond (1991) rst dierence estimator
that corrects not only for the bias included by the lagged endogenous variable, but also
permits us to specify and test dierent forms of endogeneity in the other regressors. The
resulting generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator in rst-dierences eliminates
country specic eects, using all possible lagged values of each of the variables as instruments.
More specically, as suggested by Arellano and Bond we rewrite equation (12) as:
(14) it = 11it 1 + 2ginvit + 3d pinvit + 4Xit + it
where all variables are now expressed as deviations from period means and t = 3;::;T: Of
8As Roodman (2009)discusses, system GMM does not contain a feasible ecient one-step weight matrix
H, so in the dierence GMM below we use the two-step estimations.
12central interest here is the set of internal instruments used9 , which requires us to determine
whether the explanatory variables are strictly exogenous or predetermined. We use the
theoretical strucure of the model to deal with this issue.
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4] and
Zi be a (T  2)l stacked matrix of instruments, the GMM estimator of equation(14), based












































where V is the weighting matrix that can be computed by a one step GMM estimator of the
form ^ V1 = 1=N
P
(Z0
iHZi) in which H is (T  2). In this paper we estimate the one and two-
step GMM estimators, but only report adjusted standard errors from the second step, using
the nite-sample correction proposed by Windmeijer (2005). After some experimentation
with the matrix of instruments, we report estimates using the following two mixed matrices
of instruments (in our model T=5), where strictly exogenous variables are treated in the






















where Yit = [it 1;ginvit] is the vector of predetermined variables, X1
it = [d pinv; gmil; ginv,
gcons] is a vector rst-dierence exogenous covariates, while X2
it = [corr, gmilcorr; ginvcorr] is
a vector of exogenous variables in levels. This specication is in the spirit of Holtz-Eakin,
Newey and Rosen (1988) approach of including external instruments to provide more ecient
estimations.
9The choice of the number of instruments to use for the estimation is not a trivial issue because of the
trade-o between eciency and bias (Roodman, 2009).
13The validity of these instruments can then be tested using Arellano and Bond's (1991)
Sargan test. In the dynamic specication, the consistency of the GMM systems estimator
depends on the validity of the assumption of no serial correlation of the error terms. We
investigate this by using the test by Arellano and Bond (1991), which was specically devel-
oped for dynamic panel models under GMM and tests for the presence of second-order serial
correlation in the rst dierenced error term.
4 Results
In table 1, we present the estimation results for the growth rate equation (9). We use the
estimations in the rst column (I) as a benchmark model with the indicator of corruption
variable (corr), that it is assumed to aect the proportion of the components of public
spending in GDP. In columns (II) and (III), we report parameter estimates of extended
models that include the interaction terms for the military sector and public investment.
The results show the coecient estimates for the components of government spending and
corruption to be signicant and have the expected signs. Increasing the shares of military
spending, current government consumption and corruption lead to decreases in the growth
rate, while increases in public and private investment yields an increase in the cross-crountry
economic growth rate.
As noted, corruption, as well as decreasing economic performance directly, can also in-
crease the amount of rent-seeking activity, which may reduce higher productivity activities
i:e: public investments. Support for this prediction is evident in estimations II and III,
where the interaction variable gmilcorr is positive, while ginvcorr is signicant in specication
III. The magnitude of the impact of gmilcorr is in line with that obtained by Gupta et al.
(2001) and similar for both specications. This suggests that there exist complementary
eects between the military sector and corruption that have additional eects on economic
growth to corruption per se.
14These results imply that for these African countries, corruption leads to increases in mil-
itary spending, worsening the negative impact of the larger military sector on the economy's
growth rate. Furthermore, the positive impact of ginv on the GDP growth rate appears to
be constrained by the interaction variable (ginvcorr). Thus, the existence of corruption leads
to a re-allocation of resources from more productive sectors towards less productive ones.
As military spending generates more rents, projects in this sector are likely to involve larger
amounts of money and to attract more and larger bribes (Delavallade, 2005).
Table 1: Estimation results
I II III
t 1 0.171 0.146 0.159
(0.150) (0.150) (0.138)
pinv 0.073 0.095 * 0.081
(0.050) (0.056) (0.052)
gcons -0.358 * -0.451 ** -0.348 *
(0.200) (0.196) (0.180)
ginv 0.893 ** 1.318 *** 0.687 **
(0.395) (0.426) (0.294)
gmil -0.883 ** -1.268 ** -0.949 **
(0.413) (0.493) (0.444)
corr -0.013 * -0.037 * -0.021
(0.009) (0.019) (0.021)




First order Arellano-Bond test -1.736 * -1.817 * -1.805 *
(0.082) (0.069) (0.070)
Second order Arellano-Bond test -1.553 -1.608 -1.527
(0.120) ( 0.107) (0.126)
Sargan Test 14.006 15.685 14.128
(0.525) (0.403) (0.515)
N 123 123 123
Note: The dependent variable is the growth rate of GDP, (). Estimations are two-step Dierence GMM with the Windmeijer (2005) correc-
tion. In parentheses we report the standard errors, while the asterisks stand for the p-value signicance levels  p < 0:1;  p < 0:05;  p < 0:01
Table 2 presents the estimated elasticities for the government spending components and
corruption, together with bootstrap standard errors based on 10;000 replications. The val-
15ues of the elasticties show the eect of corruption and the government spending components,
plus the eects of corruption in the public sector, for both the military sector and public
investment10. As Gupta et al. (2001) argue, the political decisions that allocate govern-
ment expenditure among the components of public spending, involve corrupt public ocials,
prescriptions and regulations that already exist.
The estimated elasticity for corruption is large ( 0:53) and its magnitude depends on
the non-linear eects of military spending when public investments are kept constant. This
measure seems reasonable for African countries for at least two reasons. First, we found a sig-
nicant and positive impact on growth rate of a unit decrease in corruption, although smaller
than the Mauro (1995), Mo (2001) and Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004) results obtained with
larger cross country datasets. In fact our GMM estimator allows us to treat the endogeneity
in some explanatory variables consistently and so avoids issues linked with 'overestimation'
of OLS parameters11. Secondly, the existence of weaker institutions in Africa, on average,
means that corruption can work as a second-best solution to market distortions imposed by
government procedures and policies, at least in the short run. This positive eect may partly
counterbalance the negative impact of corruption on economic performance in the long run.
Changes in military spending are found to have a similar eect on growth ( 0:56). This is
consistent with the argument that rent-seeking in the military sector feeds corrupt practices,
supporting the case for political intervention that directly leads to a cut of the share of
military spending in GDP to enhance the economic performance. From a policy-makers
point of view, if the resources from the military are devoted to other government sectors,
there will be an icrease in real per capita growth, conditional on the level of corruption.
Table 2 also present the estimated elasticities for two sub-samples of countries, those
with high military burden, above the median, and those with low military burden, below the
median. The estimated values for corruption in both sub-samples are similar to those for
10For example, the elasticity of military spending on GDP is calculated as: degmil = gmil(M(gmil)=M())
where M represents the mean value of the variable and gmil is the estimated parameter.
11It is worth noting that the results obtained with IV estimator from the same authors gave an insignicant
impact of corruption on per capita growth rate.
16the total sample, whereas the values for the military sector shows marked dierences, with
the negative elasticity estimate much higher in absolute terms for the countries in the high
military spending group. The results of this sensitivity analysis shows the value of trying
to disentangle the eect of complementarities between the military sector and corruption as
well as supporting our previous conclusions.
Table 2: Estimated elasticities, full and sub-samples of African countries
Endogenous Exogenous variables
Variable Military Sector Corruption
Full sample Low-military High-military Full sample Low-military High-military
sample sample sample sample
 -0.557*** -0.371*** -0.834*** -0.531*** -0.568*** -0.487***
(0.12) (0.09) (0.38) (0.22) (0.28) (0.21)
Notes: The asterisks stand for the p-value signicance levels. We have that  p < 0:1;   p < 0:05;    p < 0:01. In parentheses we provide
bootstrap standard errors. The proposed elasticity measures are referred to the second column of Table 1.
175 Conclusions
Corruption in developing countries is generally accepted to be an important obstacle
to economic growth, but there have been relatively few attempt to identify the specic
manner in which this may occur. In this paper an endogenous growth model that allows
corruption to act on economic growth, through interactions between the military sector and
civilian spending is developed and estimated on a panel of African countries over the period
2003-2007. The results conrm the predictions of the endogeneous growth model that while
government investment expenditure enhances economic growth, large military burdens and
high current government spending and corruption can reduce it.
The estimated elasticities for the full sample and for subsamples of countries with high
and low levels of miltary spending, showed that cuts in military spending are likely to directly
increase aggregate economic performances and to indirectly stem the eects of corruption.
Overall, the results provide strong evidence that, for the group of African countries studied
here, high levels of defense spending and corruption have had a damaging eect on economic
performance, both directly and indirectly.
18Appendix 1 -Descriptive statistics
Country  gmil pinv gcons ginv corr
Algeria 4.466 3.110 10.270 21.032 13.825 64.516
Angola 15.265 3.715 7.910 3.841 93.533
Benin 3.800 1.016 6.187 18.765 11.977 68.800
Botswana 4.991 3.120 9.176 26.421 10.751 19.633
Burkina Faso 5.533 1.173 7.060 28.584 10.960 47.850
Burundi 2.946 6.190 8.090 24.847 1.980 85.933
Cameroon 3.426 1.388 2.405 10.878 15.461 85.466
Cape Verde 5.711 0.670 9.715 27.181 22.425 31.216
Central African.Rep. 0.569 1.147 3.185 13.792 4.850 89.066
Chad 10.928 1.206 8.940 13.833 22.625 91.033
Comoros 1.808 5.350 5.335 74.383
Congo. Dem.Rep. 5.655 2.162 2.146 7.435 9.183 97.250
Congo. Rep. 3.745 1.544 7.841 21.204 15.810 86.166
Cote d'Ivoire 0.246 1.548 2.898 9.612 7.086 88.933
Djibouti 3.603 4.280 8.040 28.480 14.093 66.866
Egypt. Arab Rep. 4.811 2.961 7.118 16.505 9.698 59.116
Equatorial Guinea 13.271 12.663 31.185 98.616
Eritrea 1.493 24.005 16.835 43.460 5.051 50.833
Ethiopia 7.783 2.840 15.373 25.243 8.531 70.483
Gabon 2.221 1.508 4.263 12.136 19.665 70.900
Gambia. The 4.550 0.575 7.523 19.246 13.640 66.933
Ghana 5.650 0.645 12.146 23.388 15.326 50.616
Guinea-Bissau 0.416 3.456 11.595 22.623 2.471 86.816
Guinea 2.658 2.473 3.708 8.886 8.741 80.983
Kenya 45.483 1.646 3.976 19.355 13.578 82.616
Lesotho 4.100 2.510 8.521 24.050 28.738 47.750
Liberia -0.416 0.957 3.877 81.900
Libya 3.968 1.826 77.866
Madagascar 3.053 1.175 9.266 17.078 12.900 43.250
Malawi 4.190 0.920 6.162 17.082 14.694 76.883
Mali 4.660 2.160 7.728 15.191 14.376 57.250
Mauritania 5.153 3.876 8.103 28.272 23.121 48.733
Mauritius 3.901 0.185 7.625 21.185 15.203 32.500
Morocco 4.550 3.455 3.840 18.525 2.338 46.133
Mozambique 7.685 1.096 11.911 21.566 10.223 68.700
Namibia 5.053 3.030 7.543 29.656 19.220 41.150
Nigeria 6.728 0.806 93.133
Niger 3.725 0.987 7.292 18.505 8.717 82.850
Rwanda 5.855 2.213 7.243 17.271 12.945 57.233
Sao Tome&Prin. 64.766
Senegal 4.325 1.483 8.438 18.508 18.091 53.500
Seychelles 0.880 1.863 5.705 28.811 19.828 37.583
Sierra Leone 10.881 2.266 5.326 17.175 8.803 83.000
Somalia 98.783
South Africa 4.420 1.618 2.730 20.481 14.195 31.533
Sudan 7.566 3.862 4.991 11.280 12.475 93.200
Swaziland 2.673 1.870 10.326 30.096 7.428 60.333
Tanzania 6.808 1.133 7.070 20.834 10.584 70.516
Togo 2.890 1.573 3.622 12.576 17.052 78.966
Tunisia 4.870 1.572 36.866
Uganda 5.800 2.370 4.995 17.280 16.596 76.583
Zambia 5.201 1.762 8.130 16.567 14.625 74.766
Zimbabwe -5.975 3.757 2.695 20.195 12.815 94.583
Notes: We dene  as the growth rate of per-capita GDP, gmil as the share of military spending in GDP, pinv as the share of private investments
in GDP, gcons as the share of current government consumption in GDP, ginv as the share of public investments in GDP, and corr as the control
of corruption index.
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